feat(engine): add trustedproxies and remoteIP (#2632)
Co-authored-by: Søren L. Hansen <soren@linux2go.dk> Co-authored-by: Bo-Yi Wu <appleboy.tw@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: thinkerou <thinkerou@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Javier Provecho Fernandez <javiertitan@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
+67
-17
@@ -725,32 +725,82 @@ func (c *Context) ShouldBindBodyWith(obj interface{}, bb binding.BindingBody) (e
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return bb.BindBody(body, obj)
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}
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// ClientIP implements a best effort algorithm to return the real client IP, it parses
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// X-Real-IP and X-Forwarded-For in order to work properly with reverse-proxies such us: nginx or haproxy.
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// Use X-Forwarded-For before X-Real-Ip as nginx uses X-Real-Ip with the proxy's IP.
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// ClientIP implements a best effort algorithm to return the real client IP.
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// It called c.RemoteIP() under the hood, to check if the remote IP is a trusted proxy or not.
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// If it's it will then try to parse the headers defined in Engine.RemoteIPHeaders (defaulting to [X-Forwarded-For, X-Real-Ip]).
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// If the headers are nots syntactically valid OR the remote IP does not correspong to a trusted proxy,
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// the remote IP (coming form Request.RemoteAddr) is returned.
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func (c *Context) ClientIP() string {
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if c.engine.ForwardedByClientIP {
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clientIP := c.requestHeader("X-Forwarded-For")
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clientIP = strings.TrimSpace(strings.Split(clientIP, ",")[0])
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if clientIP == "" {
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clientIP = strings.TrimSpace(c.requestHeader("X-Real-Ip"))
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}
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if clientIP != "" {
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return clientIP
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}
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}
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if c.engine.AppEngine {
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if addr := c.requestHeader("X-Appengine-Remote-Addr"); addr != "" {
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return addr
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}
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}
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if ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimSpace(c.Request.RemoteAddr)); err == nil {
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return ip
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remoteIP, trusted := c.RemoteIP()
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if remoteIP == nil {
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return ""
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}
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return ""
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if trusted && c.engine.ForwardedByClientIP && c.engine.RemoteIPHeaders != nil {
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for _, headerName := range c.engine.RemoteIPHeaders {
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ip, valid := validateHeader(c.requestHeader(headerName))
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if valid {
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return ip
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}
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}
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}
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return remoteIP.String()
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}
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// RemoteIP parses the IP from Request.RemoteAddr, normalizes and returns the IP (without the port).
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// It also checks if the remoteIP is a trusted proxy or not.
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// In order to perform this validation, it will see if the IP is contained within at least one of the CIDR blocks
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// defined in Engine.TrustedProxies
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func (c *Context) RemoteIP() (net.IP, bool) {
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ip, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimSpace(c.Request.RemoteAddr))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, false
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}
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remoteIP := net.ParseIP(ip)
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if remoteIP == nil {
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return nil, false
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}
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trustedCIDRs, _ := c.engine.prepareTrustedCIDRs()
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c.engine.trustedCIDRs = trustedCIDRs
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if c.engine.trustedCIDRs != nil {
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for _, cidr := range c.engine.trustedCIDRs {
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if cidr.Contains(remoteIP) {
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return remoteIP, true
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}
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}
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}
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return remoteIP, false
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}
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func validateHeader(header string) (clientIP string, valid bool) {
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if header == "" {
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return "", false
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}
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items := strings.Split(header, ",")
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for i, ipStr := range items {
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ipStr = strings.TrimSpace(ipStr)
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ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
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if ip == nil {
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return "", false
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}
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// We need to return the first IP in the list, but,
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// we should not early return since we need to validate that
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// the rest of the header is syntactically valid
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if i == 0 {
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clientIP = ipStr
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valid = true
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}
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}
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return
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}
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// ContentType returns the Content-Type header of the request.
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