TrustedProxies: Add default IPv6 support and refactor (#2967)

This commit is contained in:
Notealot
2021-12-03 14:49:16 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 830a63d244
commit 0be805a675
3 changed files with 64 additions and 49 deletions
+47 -4
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"net/http"
"os"
"path"
"reflect"
"strings"
"sync"
@@ -28,7 +27,16 @@ var (
var defaultPlatform string
var defaultTrustedCIDRs = []*net.IPNet{{IP: net.IP{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}, Mask: net.IPMask{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0}}} // 0.0.0.0/0
var defaultTrustedCIDRs = []*net.IPNet{
{ // 0.0.0.0/0 (IPv4)
IP: net.IP{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0},
Mask: net.IPMask{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0},
},
{ // ::/0 (IPv6)
IP: net.IP{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0},
Mask: net.IPMask{0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0, 0x0},
},
}
// HandlerFunc defines the handler used by gin middleware as return value.
type HandlerFunc func(*Context)
@@ -399,9 +407,9 @@ func (engine *Engine) SetTrustedProxies(trustedProxies []string) error {
return engine.parseTrustedProxies()
}
// isUnsafeTrustedProxies compares Engine.trustedCIDRs and defaultTrustedCIDRs, it's not safe if equal (returns true)
// isUnsafeTrustedProxies checks if Engine.trustedCIDRs contains all IPs, it's not safe if it has (returns true)
func (engine *Engine) isUnsafeTrustedProxies() bool {
return reflect.DeepEqual(engine.trustedCIDRs, defaultTrustedCIDRs)
return engine.isTrustedProxy(net.ParseIP("0.0.0.0")) || engine.isTrustedProxy(net.ParseIP("::"))
}
// parseTrustedProxies parse Engine.trustedProxies to Engine.trustedCIDRs
@@ -411,6 +419,41 @@ func (engine *Engine) parseTrustedProxies() error {
return err
}
// isTrustedProxy will check whether the IP address is included in the trusted list according to Engine.trustedCIDRs
func (engine *Engine) isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
if engine.trustedCIDRs == nil {
return false
}
for _, cidr := range engine.trustedCIDRs {
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
// validateHeader will parse X-Forwarded-For header and return the trusted client IP address
func (engine *Engine) validateHeader(header string) (clientIP string, valid bool) {
if header == "" {
return "", false
}
items := strings.Split(header, ",")
for i := len(items) - 1; i >= 0; i-- {
ipStr := strings.TrimSpace(items[i])
ip := net.ParseIP(ipStr)
if ip == nil {
break
}
// X-Forwarded-For is appended by proxy
// Check IPs in reverse order and stop when find untrusted proxy
if (i == 0) || (!engine.isTrustedProxy(ip)) {
return ipStr, true
}
}
return "", false
}
// parseIP parse a string representation of an IP and returns a net.IP with the
// minimum byte representation or nil if input is invalid.
func parseIP(ip string) net.IP {